MEA Conference Outline

The 18th annual Media Ecology Association conference is coming up this Friday and will run from June 22–25 at Saint Mary’s College of California. I’ll be speaking on Friday (I think around 1:00 pm).

Feel free to drop me a line if you’ll be there and want to connect. Below I’m including the outline and notes for my talk. I’ll likely submit the final paper to the MEA’s journal, Explorations in Media EcologyMore on that soon.

Media Ecology and Bios Theoretikos: Philosophy as Extended Cognition

– In this talk I draw on the work of Peter Sloterdijk to suggest that philosophical ability is closely tied to modes of training (askēsis) that aim to transform awareness through self-overcoming (metanoia). Specifically, I explore the media environments that facilitate philosophical activity and the practices that enable philosophical understanding.

– Philosophy on this view is facilitated by an intricate ecology of affordance spaces—academies, libraries, monasteries, and more—whose design helps train up the individual’s capacity to perform certain maneuvers in thought, maneuvers that make apparent the environments required for the bios theoretikos (the life of contemplation).

– To make this point, I start not with humans and our practices, but with spiders and theirs. As I will show in my talk, when we think of philosophy as an instance of extended cognition, we can draw many parallels between our practices and those of nonhuman species, who like us build artifacts to deepen their perception and understanding.

Thinking like a Spider: Recursion and Extended Cognition

freestocks-org-128787– I first summarize Hilton Japyassú and Kevin Laland’s recent essay “Extended Spider Cognition,” looking at the difference between central cognition (located in the CNS) and extended cognition (located partially in the environment), or between central processing and peripheral processing.

– Extended cognition helps solve the problem of how a relatively simple CNS can coordinate complex behaviors by outsourcing to built artifacts found in the environment the cognitive resources required for interpretation and response.

– Reciprocal causation (or recursion) between cognition and constructed artifacts. Overtime, the created artifact (the web), and the organism (the spider), continue to co-evolve. The organism’s developmental trajectory anticipates the use of peripheral processing tools (material surrogacy). The web is the spider’s media ecology.

– The web functions as an extended cognitive–perceptual system capable of enhancing specific sensory details. The web modulates the spider’s attentional system, making it more attentive to different kinds of stimuli. The whole media­­ ecological system, rather than the encapsulated organism, is the unit of evolutionary selection and change.

– Crucially, attentional modulation is not activated by a simple mechanical trigger. Instead, the web is constructed in different sections, each one geared towards enabling awareness of certain kinds of events (i.e., the web enhances types of interpretation).

erwan-hesry-128848– The spider constructs its web in part simply by laying down one thread at a time, using previously laid thread as a cue for the next piece of web to lay down, but it also modulates its web spinning and construction by drawing on memory of previous webs and in terms of the purpose for that section of web, making unique decisions as it goes.

– The spider is thus able to enhance its cognitive situation by coupling itself with its own perception-enhancing artifact. The web is in this sense more than a simple trap or nest. It is a navigation tool that the spider uses to sense its environment more deeply.

– The spider uses its web to scaffold its own understanding of the environment, and to discern more specific meanings from it. For example, different types of thread laid down in different patterns are used to modulate different types of signal transmission (e.g., for detecting small or large prey, or for identifying an approaching mate).

– Further, signal transmission is modulated by the spider’s tensing and releasing of nearby threads, allowing it to monitor and perceive actions from a distance. The spider with its web is thus able to achieve access to its world in a more complex way than it would with its own internally located CNS alone.

– Media ecology is essentially the study of the spider and its web. This is a multispecies media ecology that studies the way an organism modifies itself through the construction of awareness-enhancing artifacts and environments. A multispecies media ecology sees the spider’s situation as fundamentally our own (human) situation.

Media Ecology and Practice as First Philosophy

hieu-vu-minh-91995– What does media ecology uncover when turned towards the practice of philosophy? Its first comment would be to see philosophy as comprised of a series of actions executed within built environments or contexts, using a set of unique navigation tools.

– The media ecology view of philosophy is similar to Sloterdijk’s claim that first philosophy is not metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, or epistemology but rather practice or training (askēsis) in the direction of conversion through self-overcoming (metanoia).

– In this analogy, what plays the role of the spider’s web for the philosopher? In other words, what artifacts and practices are available to the philosopher that enable him or her to go beyond the limitations of the isolated human CNS?

– Sloterdijk speaks of constructing “new circumstances of practice”—in other words, new media environments—that can serve as practice-amplification zones for the training of philosophical ability. What do these philosophical practice zones look like? How do they modulate our attentional and perceptual systems of understanding?

anglo-indian-heritage-centre-101322– Sloterdijk speaks of specific constructed spaces as externalized forms of metanoia (conversion) and epoché (suspension). For example, of Plato’s academy, Sloterdijk writes,

Plato was concerned to provide appropriate accommodation for persons in the precarious state of complete devotion to their thoughts. The original Academy was dedicated to nothing other than innovation in spatial creation. The Academy is the architectural equivalent of what Husserl apostrophized as epoché—a building for shutting out the world and bracketing in concern, an asylum for the mysterious guests we call ideas and theorems. In today’s parlance, we would call it a retreat or a hideaway.

Epoché and metanoia are practices facilitated by media ecologies such as retreats, monasteries, and libraries. On this view, the philosopher is the person who trains in these practice zones, using them as navigation tools for increasing signal transmission and for attuning to new senses of self and world, expressed as transformations in the individual.

– In the same way the spider tunes and styles its web for specific purposes, the aesthetics of contemplative spaces modulate the philosopher’s cognitive faculties, amplifying attention, permitting sustained practice and repetition, and affording insights that an isolated cognitive system likely would not achieve on its own.

– A media ecology is in this a sense an ecology of facilitation, an affordance space (to use James Gibson’s term), that encourages certain kinds of cognitive modulation and training. Sloterdijk’s architectural epoché, for example, aims at the production of spaces designed for suspending the mundane and promoting the practicing life.

– Philosophy thus issues from within different ecosystems of activity, from within different practice landscapes and basecamps, to use Sloterdijk’s term. We ought to think of these spaces as training grounds for physical transformation, as gymnasiums for contemplative exercise that are aided by unique tools and artifacts.

– Take writing as an example. Writing and editing a work of philosophy is fundamentally the same as a spider spinning its web. A book is not constructed from the mind whole cloth, it is rather laid down one discursive thread at a time, using a set of local cues that help style each line of each letter, finally becoming a whole work.

– Reading is also best understood on the same model. A book is more like a navigation tool that scaffolds and extends in certain ways our cognitive–perceptual system. It creates an environment that affords a new understanding of our situation. A book is like a spider web; it is a tool for navigation, a perception-enhancing artifact.

– Just as a web is geared towards modulating signal transmission, so a book should be thought of as a set of intricate affordance chains that we call sentences, each one highly stylized and laid down to extend our perceptual system. The book on this view does not contain information; it rather affords a possibility for new understanding.

– Acts of philosophical practice are thus best understood as modes of extended action executed and amplified amidst larger media ecologies that afford the bio theoretikos. In this we see a close affinity between the life of the spider and the life of the philosopher, as both are engaged in the construction of media ecologies that facilitate better navigation between and understanding of the relation between self and world.

The Knowledge Ecology

tumblr_mguzssszB41r87i11o1_500[Image: Henrique Oliveira]

I’ve been moving towards a description of the role concepts and knowledge play in action and perception. To this end, I’ve worked my way through the contributions that philosophers like Hubert Dreyfus, John McDowell, Barbara Gail Montero, and Alva Noë have made in these areas. In my most recent post, I suggested that Noë’s descriptions of concepts as bodily skills offers a compelling way of mediating between Dreyfus’s nonconceptual account of action, where action is guided by environmental solicitation in an intentional arc that progressively gears the agent into its environment, with McDowell’s view of action as concept-mediated through and through. I concluded that post by suggesting the intentional arc requires for its success some amount of conceptual content in order for it to yield the increasingly rich surplus of detail that it generates in the agent. In other words, I argued that repetition in the intentional arc must be knowledge directed.

In this post, I continue to investigate the role of knowledge in action. To repeat the claim I expressed earlier, the role of judgment in intuition implicates knowledge in the structure of our responses to solicitations. Knowledge on this account must be more than mere trial-and-error repetition because it must also include a decision about what and how to practice and repeat. Knowing what to practice and how to practice correctly goes beyond mere repetition and invokes the knowledge needed to judge the what, when, and why of a situation, all knowledge-derived and goal-oriented decisions. This accumulation of intuitive ability gained through correct practice and judgment means that the iterative pattern of acquiring new intuitions should not be thought of as merely an aggregate of past scenarios (i.e., as contextual memories), but as repetitions that, when practiced correctly, involve judgment and meaningful discrimination exercised throughout the process of training and skill building.

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Andy Clark on Perceiving as Predicting

Andy Clark’s work in the philosophy of mind has long had a strong influence on my thinking. I’ll have a bit to say about how his extended mind thesis figures into philosophical practice in my upcoming talk for the Media Ecology Assocation, but in this post I want to explore his work on predictive processing and perception, as he’s converging on similar conclusions to my own about the nature of perception, understanding, imagination, and action—namely, that they all arrive together in the co-construction of experience.

His tools and models for making this claim are different from my own, and so what most interests me in this context is how his (more advanced) resources—including a computational theory of the brain, coupled with extended and embodied notions of cognition, hierarchical predictive processing models, and Bayesian accounts of inference—match up with what I’ll shorthand as the transcendental–phenomenological resources of philosophy that I’ve been using in my recent posts. Clark is not strictly speaking a cognitive scientist, but he’s definitely closer to the “neuro” in “neurophenomenology” than I am. What’s at stake for me here is the following question, How accurate and useful are these transcendental–phenomenological resources in the face of cognitive science?

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Sketches in Philosophy

I’ve spent the past few months exploring different philosophers and philosophical traditions, German idealism and phenomenology in particular.

Here’s a list of the short philosophical sketches I’ve posted in that time (best read in the order listed):

German idealism: (1) Kant, (2) Kant and Fichte, (3) Fichte and Schelling, (4) Goethe and Kant.

Phenomenology: (1) Merleau-Ponty, (2) Hubert Dreyfus, (3) John McDowell, (4) Barbara Gail Montero, (5) Alva Noë.

The sketches are proving to be a helpful tool for thinking, more like a study for a drawing than an actual completed work, but helpful nonetheless.

Now it’s back to conference papers. I’m close to finished with my talk for the Pacific Association for the Continental Tradition (parts of which are strewn about in the links above), and then it’s back to work on my talk for the Media Ecology Association in June.


41Q8YkxbywL._SX331_BO1,204,203,200_In my last few posts, I’ve been working my way through the ideas set down by the late great Hubert Dreyfus. While I end up disagreeing with Dreyfus on a number of issues, particularly on the role of conceptuality in practical action, I still see him as largely setting the terms of the debate. As part of my effort to understand Dreyfus, I’ve been undertaking a parallel study of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who had a pronounced influence on Dreyfus. Below is a short summary of how I understand a few of Merleau-Ponty’s key insights. (Readers familiar with Merleau-Ponty won’t find too much ground-breaking interpretation in this post, but it does serve to ground the larger investigation I’ve been engaged in.)

His major work, Phenomenology of Perception, was first published in France in 1945. As the title indicates, the work deals with articulating a philosophy of perception. Drawing from his predecessors Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty in this effort gave primacy to the body’s practical comportment with the lifeworld (Lebenswelt), the historically situated and intersubjective horizon of experience from which all theoretical and scientific investigation begins, and to which it must always return. In emphasizing the body’s dynamic behavior as central to epistemological investigation—a move seen as early as his 1942 work The Structure of Behavior—Merleau-Ponty continued the work of his predecessors in returning to twentieth century philosophy the central role of embodiment in philosophy and psychology alike (the latter effort being greatly informed by gestalt theory and the neurological sciences of Merleau-Ponty’s day).

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Rethinking the Conceptual: Noë on Skills of Understanding

41mixlCjI8LThis is the third post in my exploration of the role of concepts in perception and action. The earlier posts dealt with the work of Hubert Dreyfus, John McDowell, and Barbara Gail Montero. In my last post, I ended on the question of how solicitations and motivations from the environment draw us to act in intuitively immediate (but nonconceptual) ways through a so-called space of motivations (as opposed to a Sellarsian space of reasons), suggesting that some degree of conceptual comportment is required even in unconscious action. To this end, I endorsed the views of McDowell and Montero against those of Dreyfus. In this post, I continue to explore how we ought to talk about concepts in this context.

In order to understand how a space of motivations might work, it seems likely that the conceptual must to some degree be ingredient in the structure of intuition, in the cultivated rationality or second nature of McDowell’s account. But what is a concept on this view? It certainly cannot be the kind of declarative, propositional, and detached representational item that Montero and Dreyfus both agree impede expert action, and even everyday practical comportment, for that matter. Concepts in this sense must be something else, they cannot be, as Dreyfus notes elsewhere, “context-free principles or rules that could be used to guide actions or at least make them intelligible,”[1] simply because the objects and affordances we encounter are not context free either, they are rather singular, relational, and tied to uniquely complex ecologies of materials and processes. How, then, do we talk about concepts without falling back into the Myth of the Mental?

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