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Tag: Matt Segall

Creative Valuation

The following is a short essay written in response to religious philosopher Matt Segall. The primary focus of the essay is to explore and come to terms with the ontological facts of order, creativity, and valuation. Matt has suggested, following the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, that order, creativity, and valuation stem from God’s mediation and participation in the cosmos. My reading takes off in another direction and instead posits that order, creativity, and valuation stem from the irreducible nature of things-themselves rather than from divine influence. I will consider Matt’s points via a discussion of Whitehead’s Philosophy in relation to that of mathematician Stuart Kaufmann, which will draw out what I believe is valuable in Whitehead’s philosophy whilst still differentiating it from my own.

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Footnotes to Plato in Dialogue with John Searle on Consciousness

A fantastic dialogue HERE. Matt (Footnotes to Plato) ask a series of thought provoking questions regarding 1) the extended mind/embodied cognition/enactivist paradigms in contradistinction to behavioral approaches in neurobiology and 2) The ontological questions that run parallel to the problem of consciousness in current cognitive science research. Matt (as he should!) draws on Alfred North Whitehead to ask Searle if he thinks current paradigms in cognitive science need to re-think their understanding of matter in light of something like a panexperientialist ontology.

Footnotes2Plato’s Cosmotheandrism

Matt Segall has jumped in on my previous post regarding Harman’s The Quadruple Object. When it comes to questions of philosophy and religion, Matt is always more generous than I in his ability to explore the theological implications of a given worldview, but this is only be to his credit. Where I was pushing for a more detailed account of the human in the OOO framework, Matt is pushing for a greater engagement with theology. Matt writes:

Harman’s is an ontology that re-orients our human-centricity relative to objects in general, such that objects become full, autonomous participants in the cosmic drama right along side us. Humans are not ‘up ahead’ of objects in general, not the leading edge of evolution; neither are they any closer to Being than every other being. Harman’s is a sorely needed intervention into the philosophies of access currently dominating the Academy, especially in light of the difficulties faced by phenomenology and scientific naturalism alike when it comes to devising an actionable ethical response to an increasingly inevitable natural/ecological catastrophe. But in order to avoid spinning into the nihilism of some speculative realists, where human values are a fluke in an uncaring and fundamentally entropic universe (I’m thinking more of Brassier than Harman here), I think OOO needs to unpack its own theological and anthropological implications.

For Matt, Cosmos, Anthropos, and Theos form an interdependent trinity, and I think he would be fine with me suggesting that, for him, any philosophy that does not consider these three spheres is inadequate. My own approach is more modest, though I find his refreshing insofar as it offers a postsecular view of religiosity, whilst not limiting the religious to the aporias offered by some continental philosophers (I am thinking here perhaps of Caputo’s reading of Derrida).  I happen to be an admirer of the aporia in general, but what I find so refreshing about Matt’s perspective is that he doesn’t relegate religious philosophy to the unspeakable mysteries of the cosmos, or to the infinite distance and ethical imperatives generated by the other (more themes I admire). Rather, Matt, following perhaps closest in the footsteps of Plato, Schelling, and Whitehead, is attempting to build a profound image of this cosmotheandric trinity rooted in some kind of Goethean phenomenology, nested within an ontology of the imagination.

I think its safe to say that I will never engage religion and theology in the same way Matt does, I have much to skeptical of a mind (at least at this stage in my life) to philosophize publicly about the nature of the relationship between Theos and Cosmos. Like many others my religious intuitions are rooted in experiences I have poor tools to account for and describe. For now I am quite happy to watch from a (near) distance as Matt develops his own kind of panentheism. As I noted in my previous post, I think we are still in the beginnings of exploring what an object-oriented framework is capable of revealing, particularly in other disciplines and areas of inquiry. For this we should celebrate.

Cognitive Ethology 2

I remain duly unsatisfied with the line of inquiry I began in my last post on Mark Bekoff and cognitive ethology. I was trying to sort through what it is that makes humans different from animals, and whether or not such a distinction still makes sense to make. I’m still committed to the idea that, if we follow Bekoff, and make things like thought, emotions, interiority, problem-solving, mourning, and revenge, the province of not just human animals, but also mice, whales, cheetahs, dolphins and others, then we are adding depth to the human-animal debate in an important way.

If we say “humans are just another kind of animal,” but animals engage in many typically “human” activities (including the production and transmission of “cultural” knowledge) then it seems more appropriate to suggest that humans and animals are different kinds of persons. How do we make distinctions then? I like what Matt Segall recently wrote with regards to Eugene Thacker’s work in After Life. Matt writes:

Distinguishing the human animal from other forms of life is controversial, both philosophically and politically, but perhaps it is precisely in thinking life-in-itself, or at least in thinking the impossibility of such a thought, that the human distinguishes itself from other beings. It is not that the life of a dog is not, in some sense,meaningful for the dog; but can the dog pre-discursively form anything like the proposition “what is the meaning of life?” Not “what is the meaning of life for me,” mind you, but the meaning of life in general. The contemplation of the aporia of life-in-itself seems to be a specifically human predicament.

I think this is worth discussing further, and while I think Matt is on the right track here, I also want to ask: what does it mean that elephants perform burial rituals for both other elephants and other species such as the rhinoceros (as Bekoff says is the case)? Is there some contemplation of the meaning of “life itself” and its inevitable end result in death? It seems that elephants in this case are contemplating not just their own life cycles, but also acknowledging that such cycles are a property for living beings in general, which would in a way hint that they are contemplating the meaning of life not just “for them.” Of course, I am speculating, but I think its worth thinking about. Elephants partaking in the aporia of the life/death mystery? Thats the kind of question I’m interested in. More to come, Im sure.

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