May 13, 2015 § 5 Comments
In Process and Reality Alfred North Whitehead writes, “a new idea introduces a new alternative; and we are no less indebted to a thinker when we adopt the alternative which he discarded. Philosophy never reverts to its old position after the shock of a new philosopher.” In this paper I ask, what is an idea? How does it introduce a new alternative? How does this new alternative relate to knowledge and experience? My aim is to persuade you that the best way to understand an idea is to describe the ecological relations among thought, action, and perception.
To present my position, I draw on literature from the philosophy mind, particularly enactivism, to propose that knowledge is a skill of engagement. It is an attunement to new contrasts made possible by the coordination of multiple species, practices, and technologies. Similarly, I define conceptualization as a speculative capacity, a performance of the body that leaps the subject beyond immediacy into the spaces of difference afforded by the present. I conclude by suggesting that the ecological view of knowledge has important consequences for the politics and ethics of first-person experience. « Read the rest of this entry »
December 23, 2014 § 1 Comment
In the next few posts I will explore a set of familiar problems: The relation of knowledge to the world, on the one hand, and the relation of knowledge to subjects, on the other. These questions, in turn, connect with two general images of thought, the representational and the enactive. Among many others, we find variants of this distinction in the works of Isabelle Stengers and Andrew Pickering. For Stengers this distinction plays out in the difference between the ecology of ideas and the ecology of practices. For Pickering it plays out through the representational and the performative idioms of knowledge. While I share with Stengers and Pickering the emphasis on practice, I also believe there are good reasons that representational and enactive accounts of knowledge are not mutually exclusive. Instead, I argue, they are different moments in the ecology of learning: A representation is a concept that is not yet internalized and is therefore not yet a part of the subject’s lived experience of the world. An enaction is a concept integrated as part of the subject’s capacity to perceive the environment and is therefore part of the subject’s practical engagement with his or her surroundings.
The shift between these moments marks the concept’s move from theoretical possibility to practical actuality. In the posts to follow I will explore how it is that a concept can move from a conscious representation to a capacity of the body, absorbed as part of the subject’s skillful ability to engage the environment. I suggest there are three phases to the process. First, the concept is accessed as a symbol obtained from the surrounding media environment. Second, the concept is held as a conscious representation within the subject’s perceptual field. Third, the concept moves from conscious representation to unconscious capacity, operating as an organizer of experience. To describe these phases, I first discuss the role of concepts in sensation, which I take as analogous to the relationship between knowledge and experience or idea and practice. I then describe in more detail the conditions that bring different concepts and senses into and out of contact with different kinds of subjects. The role of the media environment is central to this part of the discussion. Finally, I suggest that this ongoing transformation of sensation and conception is best described as an ecology of knowledge enacted by an ecology of bodies and nonhuman agents.
April 16, 2014 § 6 Comments
[Image: Vincent Fournier]
I’ll be speaking with some of the usual suspects at the International Big History Association Conference this August at Dominican University in San Rafael, California. Our Panel description and abstracts can be found below.
Panel Title: Cosmopolitics and the Big Journey: Resolving Nature-Culture Dualisms
Abstract: In its research and teaching programs, Big History facilitates the integration of human and natural history into a multidimensional collective history. There is still much work that remains to be done to articulate collective history without falling back into longstanding dualisms that separate humans from nature. Along those lines, Big History can benefit from a dialogical encounter with others who are oriented toward overcoming the human/nature dualism, including those involved in the Journey of the Universe project and, in a very different vein, philosophers like Isabelle Stengers, Bruno Latour, and others associated with a theoretical movement called “cosmopolitics,” which aims to overcome the separation between the natural world (kosmos) and the constitution of human civilization (politikos). Initially developed by Stengers following her work with Ilya Prigogine, cosmopolitics aims to articulate a collective history that affirms the intertwining of human societies with the evolutionary unfolding of the cosmos. Cosmopolitics draws more explicitly than Big History on philosophical concepts useful for overcoming the dualisms separating a realm of humans (subjects, values) from a realm of nature (objects, facts), including concepts associated with process philosophy (Alfred North Whitehead), philosophical biology (Jakob von Uexküll), and French post-structuralist philosophy (Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida). This panel introduces the idea of cosmopolitics and situates it in relationship to similar approaches to collective history (e.g., Big History, Journey of the Universe), drawing particular attention to the importance of accounting for the axiological dimensions (e.g., ethics, aesthetics, and spirituality) of our collective history. « Read the rest of this entry »
October 9, 2013 § 46 Comments
[Photo: Casey Cripe]
Alva Noë recently posted a short commentary on the entanglement of science and values. I think readers will be interested in it. At first blush Noë’s point is fairly straight forward: Science and values are always entangled because the very characteristics science depends on — reason, consistency, coherence, plausibility, and replicability — are themselves values. Without some kind of agreement that these are the values that best serve the creation of scientific facts there would be no foundation upon which the sciences could maintain consistency. Science depends on a set of extra-scientific decisions, and we need to pursue and cultivate these decisions in order for the possibility of science to emerge in the first place. Simple enough. « Read the rest of this entry »
July 14, 2013 § 13 Comments
[Image: Mona Hatoum]
Next Saturday July 20 I’ll be presenting a paper at the Integral Theory Conference in San Francisco. This year a major theme of the conference will be an Integral Theory – Critical Realism dialogue with Roy Bhaskar himself giving a keynote at the event. Though I am neither an Integral Theorist nor Critical Realist per se, I am happy to contribute my own thoughts on ecology and philosophy to an already diverse event. My paper considers the avenues opened up by thinking about the ontology of concepts and ideas from an ecological perspective. More specifically, I explore the relation between subjectivity and an ecological conception of concepts. I’ve uploaded a finalized version of my paper for tomorrow. You can read it here here, or in the text below. « Read the rest of this entry »
May 21, 2013 § 5 Comments