Concept and Sense I

December 23, 2014 § 1 Comment


In the next few posts I will explore a set of familiar problems: The relation of knowledge to the world, on the one hand, and the relation of knowledge to subjects, on the other. These questions, in turn, connect with two general images of thought, the representational and the enactive. Among many others, we find variants of this distinction in the works of Isabelle Stengers and Andrew Pickering. For Stengers this distinction plays out in the difference between the ecology of ideas and the ecology of practices. For Pickering it plays out through the representational and the performative idioms of knowledge. While I share with Stengers and Pickering the emphasis on practice, I also believe there are good reasons that representational and enactive accounts of knowledge are not mutually exclusive. Instead, I argue, they are different moments in the ecology of learning: A representation is a concept that is not yet internalized and is therefore not yet a part of the subject’s lived experience of the world. An enaction is a concept integrated as part of the subject’s capacity to perceive the environment and is therefore part of the subject’s practical engagement with his or her surroundings.

The shift between these moments marks the concept’s move from theoretical possibility to practical actuality. In the posts to follow I will explore how it is that a concept can move from a conscious representation to a capacity of the body, absorbed as part of the subject’s skillful ability to engage the environment. I suggest there are three phases to the process. First, the concept is accessed as a symbol obtained from the surrounding media environment. Second, the concept is held as a conscious representation within the subject’s perceptual field. Third, the concept moves from conscious representation to unconscious capacity, operating as an organizer of experience. To describe these phases, I first discuss the role of concepts in sensation, which I take as analogous to the relationship between knowledge and experience or idea and practice. I then describe in more detail the conditions that bring different concepts and senses into and out of contact with different kinds of subjects. The role of the media environment is central to this part of the discussion. Finally, I suggest that this ongoing transformation of sensation and conception is best described as an ecology of knowledge enacted by an ecology of bodies and nonhuman agents.

Noë and Uexküll: Ecology, Style, and Meaning

June 3, 2014 § 40 Comments

tumblr_mm96ib07g81qzngato1_1280[Image: Tomas Rak]

I have been exploring Alva Noë’s actionist account of perception and cognition in terms of an ecological account of the subject-concept relation. In my previous posts (here and here), I have emphasized a level of conceptual understanding that presupposes both language and the capacity to learn new concepts, or, more interestingly, I have described the way in which a subject can never really learn anything new but rather can only become someone with a new set of conceptual capacities through learning and practice. In this view, the subject-concept relation is ecological insofar as the concept has a symbiotic relation to the subject that both displaces and creates new conceptual capacities. To be more specific, and to repeat my phrasing from the earlier posts, learning initiates a symbiosis between subject and concept that ends in the merging of the concept with the subject and of the transformation of the subject through its understanding of the concept. « Read the rest of this entry »

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