Response to Naught Thought
by Adam Robbert
Ben Woodward over at Naught Thought has THIS timely post concerning the rather fuzzy distinctions that are emerging at the intersections of process philosophy (PP), object-oriented ontology (OOO), and speculative realism/materialism (SR/SM). I see Woodward requesting a response with two fronts: first, for greater clarity and formalization amongst process philosophers. Second, a greater distinction between OOO and other branches of SR/SM. I can help with the first question, and less so with the second- I am too unfamiliar with the SR/SM territory to comment, save for my one reading of Meillassoux (sorry Ben!). As far as Meillassoux goes, I know there are folks out there who see many similarities between his work and the PP framework (particularly in Whitehead), hopefully a more able person can address these issues.
Moving along to the first part of the question, Woodward begins with the following charge:
One of the rhetorical disadvantages to philosophies of process, or dispositions, or becoming (or however else you want to couch them) is that there’s a fuzziness that there doesn’t seem to be an urge to clarify. Part of this is the fact that these philosophies are non-common sensical and are therefore ontologically fuzzy – one cannot pick up a flow of time, or becoming itself like one can grasp an object.
What Woodward is looking for, as I read him, is the quite sensible call to an increased clarity amidst the collision of several, perhaps historically less related, traditions of philosophy. These would include PP, OOO, SR/SM, but also various strands of pragmatism, pluralism, and perhaps the vibrant materialism of Jane Bennett. First, a quick qualification. In my own recent writings I have in fact been arguing for an object-oriented approach to ecology (which is at the center of my philosophical musings) and not a process-relational one. Does this make me an object-oriented philosopher? Indeed, by most qualifications, it does. Nevertheless, I am happy to respond to Woodward’s request, as I have many affinities with process philosophy, and, as I shall argue, I am still unconvinced that sufficient distinctions have been made between OOO and PP.
In this regard, Whitehead remains simultaneously the most central and underread figure at the intersection of the OOO and PP debate- Woodward, I’m sure you’ve already studied him, but, being that Whitehead is a central figure in this discussion, I would like to say that I don’t find him “fuzzy” in any way. Quite the contrary, I find his exposition to be, at times, so dense and explicit that I might make the opposite claim- he could stand to be a little more fuzzy. Nevertheless, I find Woodward’s call to discussion helpful insofar as there are numerous distinctions between the OOO camp and the process relational camp that, once clarified, seem to draw them perilously close together (to the dismay of both groups perhaps- save the pluralists who always strike me as remarkably amphibious in their capacities to hold multiple ontologies).
Harman, as readers of his work well know, will reject the possibility of process philosophy and OOO being commensurable- at the end of the day you are either one or the other. Fine. Yet, when we crack open Harman’s “quadruple object” we find, within each irreducible object, a manifold of scurrying, dynamic processes, which constitute the “substance” of each object (I don’t currently have the text at hand, so unfortunately I cannot add any citations). Likewise, for Levy Bryant, whom has recently reiterated his position on the question of “substance” from the OOO perspective writes: “In The Democracy of Objects, I argue that substances are dynamic systems. In other words, I see no contradiction between substance and process precisely because I hold that substances are processes and processes are substances.” Thus in both Harman and Bryant we find rather dynamic notions of the withdrawal of the real object (Harman) and the description of substance as a dynamic system (Bryant). Furthermore, in the works of Tim Morton, we find similar passages, such as the following:
Life-forms are liquid: positing them as separate is like putting a stick in a river and saying, “This is river stage x” (Quine). Queer ecology requires a vocabulary envisioning this liquid life. I propose that life-forms constitute a mesh, a nontotalizable, open-ended concatenation of interrelations that blur and confound boundaries at practically any level: between species, between the living and the nonliving, between organism and environment (“Queer Ecology,” pp. 275-276).
Thus, rather clearly, we find descriptive phrases from 3/4 of the OOO theorists that would seem to position them as “process philosophers.” We of course know this is not what they are claiming. So what is the difference between an object-oriented philosopher and process-philosopher? There are of course differences in the background traditions- pragmatism/radical empiricism for the PP camp and Heidegger and other phenomenologists in the OOO camp (at least for Harman). Rather than focusing on these divergent histories (which have their own complex instances of overlap), I’ll just mention a few philosophical positions that each group argues, that, as we shall see, are really rather close.
Harman is primarily concerned with “undermining” and “overmining” the identity of objects through reductionism or holism, a charge he makes against reductionists, holists, and relationists. For Harman, “relationism” reduces an object to its contexts, flows, or networks. This, I think, is his main charge against the PP camp. Sounds great. Yet, in William Connolly’s A World of Becoming we find a similar notion being raised through what he calls “individualism” and “holism” (p. 32), two paths he is seeking not to tread. On this path Connolly is influenced by William James’ A Pluralistic Universe (p. 33). Therefore, it seems that Connolly, who is surely a philosopher of “becoming,” is arguing the same as Harman- though from a process point of view. Entities cannot be undermined or overmined in Harman and Connolly’s view (Connolly calls his position “connectionist” though I’m throwing him in with the PP camp). Similarly, Matt Segall has, on several occasions, posited that Whitehead himself does not in fact reduce any entities to their relations. Drawing primarily on Whitehead’s concept of the “subject-superject” as indicative of a kind of withdrawal in Whitehead, Segall suggests that a process-relational view does not overmine entities (Steven Shaviro perhaps also agrees with this reading of Whitehead). Thus from both the PP and OOO points of view, we find irreducible entities, engaged in multi-tiered sets of interactions. In other words, we find objects. Further, and in the other direction, we find, in both PP and OOO, all kinds of dynamic flows, processes, evolutionary currents and interrelations. Whats going on here then? Have the differences been overstated? I have a thought on this question. Actually, Marshall McLuhan has a thought, and it might help us out.
Recall that for McLuhan the “tetrad” is composed of four simultaneous actions. Each medium “enhances,” “reverses into,” “retrieves,” and “obsolseces” other forms of media (or, if you follow Levi Bryant’s expanded tetrad- which I do- this applies to all object-object relations, and not just human made objects). We’ll skip an in depth examination of the tetrad and instead focus on one of its elements- the reversal. For McLuhan, all media, when pushed to their limits, reverse into their opposite. For example, the satellite expands human media into space, extending the human sense of sight (as in GPS satellites), but, simultaneously, this medium effects its own reversal in that the satellite also implodes the size of the planet into a more observable domain, thereby retrieving “ecology” and obsolescing “nature” (Laws of Media, p. 151).
For McLuhan, this notion of simultaneity in the tetrad means that each of the four aspects of media are occurring at the same time, not in linear sequence, though each element can be abstracted from the fuller complex by means of an open-ended encounter with an observer. My sense is, then, that “processes” and “objects” are like McLuhan’s tetrads. Each object is simultaneously substance and process, with each one reversing into the other depending on specific encounters with other objects. Though at each point of encounter, all objects are integral insofar as they are irreducible to both smaller individual entities, and larger ongoing flows of interaction. For example, cells are irreducible objects insofar as we encounter them as cells, however, for the virus, the cell is a collective of organelles, proteins, and electrical processes. The cell is both object and process, individual and collective. I’m thinking through this position in light of one of Woodward’s later comments in his post, where he writes:
Furthermore, for quite a few theorists, it’s comfortable to reside in the middle ground or way station of materialism because it allows one to work with vitalism, dynamism, becoming etc without any attempt at explaining formalization, persistence, or any other occurrence which seems at odds with process, flow, power, and so on.
It may very well be the case that “formalization, persistence, or any other occurrence” are not at all at odds with “process, flow, power, and so on,” if we accept something like McLuhan’s tetrad in our ontology. Thus the “middle ground” is perhaps more aptly called a “multiple ground.” Perhaps this tetrad reading of the OOO-PP dispute is useful, or perhaps I am being too easy, and, as Woodward rightly points out, I am using process as an escape hatch for argument. I don’t think this to be the case, but I am happy to debate the point further.
Adam,
The more I read, the more I want to enter these conversations, and the less prepared I feel as every time I try to grasp OOO it slips away and I was perhaps arguing against a straw man. I thank Levi again for his explanations that cleared things up for me per his view. Peirce and Whitehead are extremely clear, and thus I think the fuzziness might be due to miscommunication and misunderstanding.
For instance, as I understand process, or as I write on it, your following statement is just assumed.
“Each object is simultaneously substance and process, with each one reversing into the other depending on specific encounters with other objects. Though at each point of encounter, all objects are integral insofar as they are irreducible to both smaller individual entities, and larger ongoing flows of interaction.”
If we replace “object” with “emergent event” or some synonym, and “substance” with actuality, and leave “process,” then I have never thought otherwise. However, as I slowly go through the literature, most recently “vicarious causation,” and talk to scholars, I just do not feel that they see “process metaphysics” as agreeing to that statement. I know Leon does for sure, and I presume the Whiteheadians in general do as well. I am confused.
What are we debating again? Really? Or am I just not sufficiently informed of what “process” means in this ongoing blogosphere conversation? I have started to suspect this. So, let me give my own response about why the statement is the case.
The emergent event comes to be through the transaction of other events, other transacting complexes of potentialities. Hence, for one to be, many must be. This invokes internal relations. This may also be called a dynamic system in the sense that the organization of the complexities is also causally efficacious over and above the mere enumeration of potentialities. Think of electromagnetic wave interference patterns. All this organization, complex, and system-talk is the relational aspect. However, once the event emerges, novel possibilities are created that are not reducible from the actual event. The transaction of force/existence is fundamentally creative, because it is taken as basic that transaction changes a thing, and that things own self-similarity is not static (cf Peirce’s tychism). Perhaps this is an analogue of “hidden powers,” although I do not go so far as to presume that or to speak of an “irreducible core.” Partly, this is because the event persists only through the relative stability of its local transactive environment.
There is a sense in which for the many to be, there must be one. This is Peirce’s synechism, or theory of continuity. For things to ever affect each other, they must always already be related, and they are in a way “integral.” Hence, there is a sense in which relations are external, because mere relationality is not causally efficacious. Again, organization is an issue, spatial as well as temporal, although I take time to be more fundamental than space. What distinguishes the external vs. internal moment of these relations is the event of emergence, which is analogous to Whiteheadian concresence of an actual occasion. (Whitehead’s version is far more detailed than my current Peirce-Dewey one, although I’m aiming at phenomenology and have been developing other aspects.)
In all this, substance is not an over-riding concept. The fundamental categories are the triad, especially as understood as possibility, force/activity/existence, and determinate existence/law/habit etc. As I have explained it here, the emergence of the event emphasizes secondness and thirdness, active potentiality and its actualization, neither of which are well explained by the term “substance.”
Side note, although I’ve mentioned this on my blog. This is a heavily modified Aristotelian potentiality. Potentiality is always active unless actively inhibited by another. And a potentiality does not have an exclusive, determinate realization unto actuality (entelechy). Any pure potentiality (kinesis) has a realization (entelechy), but the transaction of potentialities, as well as their structure, their change, their rate of change, stability/chance, etc. combine to form a greater realization. That is, entelechies are composed and composable all the way up or down to the limit of intelligiblity. This relates to my discussion elsewhere of why there is something rather than nothing, as asking questions of cosmogenesis and evolution with this view gets dicey. I mention this side note about potentiality to further explain the source of creativity.
I hope that I have been of service, and I will repost this on my blog.
Jason- The difference between OOO and PP is summed up by your statement: “Perhaps this is an analogue of “hidden powers,” although I do not go so far as to presume that or to speak of an “irreducible core.” Partly, this is because the event persists only through the relative stability of its local transactive environment.” This, in my mind, is what separates, at least Harman, from being a process philosopher in the normal sense of the word- he has quite a lot to say about “irreducible cores.”
[...] generally agree with Leon‘s and Adam‘s arguments that the differences have been overstated, particularly if one takes into account [...]
Adam,
So his view is decidedly not an event ontology in this sense. Bryant appears to have agreed, against Harman, with my statement.
The reason that I balk at “irreducible cores” is that it smashes the “arbitrary posit” button. Why irreducible? Once we claim that something is irreducible, then we are right back into a derivative of conventional substance ontology. There’s nothing wrong with that, but then I ask the question of why we should bother with yet another novel substance ontology ; it must provide something that prior ontologies did not, or else we are better served spending our time developing established models. While I agree to letting “a thousands flower bloom,” as I am a pluralist, I then no longer find anything compelling about it. I suspect these may appear to be harsh words, but I am against the tendency in continental to devise ever new and complicated philosophies. Analytic is far worse in that respect.
What I have said lays aside the conventional philosophical problems of that position, e.g., how does one explain persistence, change, etc.
AR thanks for your efforts here I’m not as sanguine about achieving a comprehensive overview as I try and spell out (perhaps all too briefly) here:
http://footnotes2plato.com/2011/08/17/in-defense-of-wonder-a-response-to-naught-thought-on-whiteheads-philosophy-of-dawn/#comment-1187
JH, might help to read the OOO books/articles to get a better sense of where they are coming from, one of the unfortunate illusions/distortions of blog-posts is that they can seem to render the complex into easily graspable units/tools.
Dmf,
I am doing that reading, and have been doing so. Much of the problem is that this crowd uses many of the same words as my field, but clearly the denotation, intention, and background differs and it took me a few weeks to realize how extensive it is. I have a number of friends who follow these debates and who have been handing me the books.
That said, I do work in this field, or better said this topic, but it appears that I’ll have to bridge a pragmatist/continental translation barrier.
Jason,
I like irreducible cores, and think that they can do some work with respect to value. Is a core is an intensity, power, capacity – then in those respects any core has an infinite worth in its power to produce effects – some producing more or greater effects than others. So a core isn’t a cold dead center, it is an active nature that withdraws as we try to grasp it. Yet “it” is singular (I think, for now). Hopefully this makes some sense -typing during my travels.
[...] responses to my last post are here at Knowledge Ecology, here at Immanence, here at Footnotes 2 Plato, here at After Nature, and at [...]
AR, if you get a chance sometime I’d be interested in you take on:
http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2851
Leon,
I agree with everything you say, but let me put it in this perspective that tries to specify what is irreducible. I reject the idea that an actual event (object) “has” an irreducible core that constitutes its distinctness, and much of the argument is due to how I understand the composition/composability of powers.
An object may “have” irreducible cores in the sense that powers are “atomic” as are the emergent properties of actual events. The powers are irreducible to the event, and the emergent properties, e.g., created powers, are irreducible to those that constitute the actuality of the event. There’s your irreducibility. However, and this might be my misunderstanding of Harman’s position, the actual event (or object?) does not “possess” those powers. That whole is not a discrete unit. In sum, irreducibility is tied to either the emergence of the event, or the powers themselves, but not the actuality or “identity” of the event. Hence, given that “substance” and “identity” usually go hand-in-hand, though not if we read our Aristotle carefully, I refuse to use the term substance as it is misleading. I suspect that OOO positions differ of the proposed logical treatment of irreducibility, identity, and the fundamental unit of existence or analysis. I believe that Bryant and Harman disagree on this point, so we should not assume that there are just two positions; see my discussion with Bryant on his blog.
By the way, the hard distinction between constitutive powers of an actual event and its emergent powers is temporal; constitutive powers must be in play to constitute provide persistence for the actual event, and only afterwards do the emergent powers manifest.