Integral Ecology Reading Group Week #2
by Adam Robbert
Comments on Chapter 2, “It’s All About Perspectives: The AQAL Model”
By Sam Mickey
Chapter 2 gets us further into the AQAL model: the all-quadrant, all-level framework that we started exploring last week. The AQAL model was developed by Wilber in the 1990s, and E-H&Z follow Wilber very closely, maybe even too closely (perhaps “slavishly,” following Adrian’s comment last week). Before elaborating on the specifics of the AQAL framework (pronounced ah-qwul), E-H&Z discuss the “perspectivalism” that is “[c]entral to this framework” (48).
Perspectivalism involves post-disciplinarity. E-H&Z mention that, while their aim to “organize and integrate many different perspectives” shares some commonalities with interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research, the Integral approach is actually “postdisciplinary” insofar as it can be used in contexts that are disciplinary, multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary (47). Post-disciplinary is synonymous with meta-disciplinary, as they mention in a footnote (557n5). Are they drawing too precise of distinctions here with this proliferation of prefixes? Or maybe not precise enough? That is a question I have for Integral Theory in general. I appreciate all of the distinctions, but I feel like they always slip into too much precision (e.g., distinguishing between inter-, meta-, multi-, post-, and meta-) and not enough precision (giving short shrift to Romanticism and postmodernism). Reading Integral Theory, I’m often reminded of Aristotle (Ethics, 1094b) saying that an educated person is one who adheres to the clarity of what they study, treating objects of study with the precision those objects call for, not less precision, and not more.
After proposing post-disciplinarity, E-H&Z describe two aspects of perspectivalism, ontological and epistemological. First, an ontological claim (“sentient beings are capable of taking a perspective, or opening a clearing that allows phenomena to present and reveal themselves”) (48). The phrase “opening a clearing” sounds suspiciously Heideggerian to me (especially knowing that Zimmerman is a Heidegger scholar). In any case, this claim implies that perspective (like interiority) isn’t exclusively human. Rather, the world is made of perspectives. This concept of perspective is supposed to clarify the subject-object dualism of modernity. There are no subjects opposed to objects (49). Every being (or “holon”) is a situated perspective encountering other beings (i.e., other situated perspectives). This leads to the second aspect of perspectivalism, an epistemological claim (“all knowing is perspectival”) (48-49). We are told not to “confuse the map with the territory” but, instead, to recognize how “the map is a performance of the territory,” such that all knowledges (all maps) are situated in the concrete limits of perspectives (50, 55). Against postmodern relativism (a straw man, to be sure), perspectivalism asserts that the partial truths of perspectives can be arranged according to nested hierarchies (holarchy) in which truths transcend and include any less comprehensive truths (63f).
After explaining their perspectivalism, they introduce the five basic elements of the AQAL model: Quadrants, Levels, Lines, States, and Types. Every perspective can be mapped in terms of those five elements. Consider whether some of these elements might be more relevant than others (for instance, some of us find it useful to use quadrants but not levels).
We’ve already heard about the quadrants: subjective (“I”), intersubjective (“we”), objective (“it”), and interobjective (“its”). These are roughly equivalent to fine arts, humanities, natural sciences, and social sciences, respectively (62), and each of those is associated with two methodologies, such that Integral Methodological Pluralism (IMP) includes 8 methodological families (we’ll hear more on IMP later) (65). For the sake of user-friendliness, the last two quadrants are sometimes combined, forming the “big three” of I (1st-person), We (2nd-person), and It/s (3rd-person) (56). The Big Three resemble Felix Guattari’s 3 ecologies (mental, social, and environmental), although this connection is only mentioned later in the book (598n3).
Quadrants are different from quadrivia, with the former designating the four dimensions of things (ontology) and the latter designating four ways of seeing things (epistemology/methodology). We can analyze the four quadrants of a thing, and we can do so from four different quadrivia. We can take a 1st-, 2nd-, or 3rd-person perspective on an I, We, or It/s. This gets complicated, involving an “integral math” where taking a 1st-person perspective on a 1st person reality is notated as 1-p x 1p (557n9). It’s relatively confusing, and the role of hyphens in this math only makes it more complicated. Does AQAL run the risk of being too simplistic and/or too complicated to be put to effective use in addressing ecological theory and practice?
We’ve heard about the levels (or “waves of development”) already, and we’ll go into more detail about them in chapter 4. Lines of development are different than levels/waves. Lines include multiple capacities, each of which can develop into new levels/waves. With lines of “cognitive, emotional, interpersonal, and moral capacities,” the lines follow closely Howard Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences (54). I can move from an egocentric to sociocentric level of psychological development in my cognitive capacity, while still being egocentric in my moral capacity.
States are temporary perspectives, which stand in contrast to stabilized stages of development. For instance, I can experience a temporary state of highly developed moral capacities, yet fall back into my normal moral capacities the next day, as when people are exceptionally compassionate toward one another for brief periods during holidays or following natural disasters. Finally, there are the styles or types that arise in different perspectives (different types of government, personality types, blood types, etc.).
So, that’s the framework in a nutshell. The authors try to apply the framework in an analysis of social autopoiesis (drawing on Niklas Luhmann, who draws on Jakob von Uexkull’s umwelt theory) (67-74), including some interesting examples of communication regarding water pollution (71f) and global climate change (73).
The authors keep reminding us not to take their framework too literally and not to mistake the map for the territory. They reassure us that the flat representation of the AQAL model is “not a Cartesian grid” but is more of a “Buddhist mandala,” which is full of multidimensionality and depth that are only discerned in light of meditative engagements (59). I appreciate their Buddhist orientation and their compassion for all sentient beings, but the AQAL framework is still proposed as a theoretical framework and not just as a mandala. The specificity of ecological phenomena can be obfuscated not only by the framework’s overgeneralizations and misappropriations, but also by any reliance upon a model or framework at all. In other words, a possible concern here is that Integral Theory uses AQAL in a way that privileges system over method (or assimilates method into system).
I first learned about Wilber and Integral Theory in 2005, and I’m still not sure how helpful the AQAL framework really is (surely, it’s different for different perspectives). Sometimes it seems that the framework is more trouble than it’s worth, as in cases of “integral math,” spellings of NATURE/Nature/nature, or the easily confusing distinction made on page 70 between a member and a part of a system or the distinction between inside-outside and internal-external. When the framework appears helpful, I wonder whether it is because of the framework itself or the concepts that the framework is (mis)appropriating. For instance, “enactment” seems helpful, but one does not need AQAL to adhere to the principle of enactment (66). Perhaps the proof is in the pudding, such that the value of the AQAL model is only evident if we see it in action. That will have to wait for later chapters, as we finish eating our meat before having that pudding.
Thanks for this, Sam. Parallel to my reading of Integral Ecology I am also trying to take in Whitehead’s work Science and the Modern World. The latest section in the latter work I think bears important consequences for thinking about the AQAL model (and also connects to your own comments about Aristotle, Sam). Whitehead’s tracing of the impact of mathematical and scientific thought through history can help us here. Whitehead is particularly concerned about the difference between classification and measurement when he writes: “The popularity of Aristotelian Logic retarded the advance of physical science through out the Middle Ages. If only the schoolmen had measured instead of classifying, how much they might have learnt!” (1967, p. 28). An important idea to be sure, and I would like to further qualify Whitehead’s statement in this way: where Whitehead is specifically speaking to the need for quantitative measurement, we might suggest a more general need for multiple modes of description (as the Integral Theorists do with IMP), rather than placing such a strong emphasis on methods of classification. If we take this more general reading of Whitehead’s call to measurement over classification, than I think we can go some way to articulating what it is that is difficult for me about AQAL.
It is quite apparent that the AQAL model is very heavy on classification, possibly at the expense of adequate description. Sam, I think this goes some way to further pushing your point that AQAL can be both “too precise” and “not precise enough.” I would say it is too precise in classification and not precise enough in description. But let’s complicate this a little bit, and see if we can’t justify some of what AQAL is trying to accomplish. Whitehead is also quick to note that “The first phase of the Middle Ages was an age of symbolism. It was an age of vast ideas, and of primitive technique” (1967, p.13). I read this passage to mean that, while pre-modern Europe was capable of creative and vast thinking (i.e. metaphysical thinking) it lacked the critical tools that would come later, starting perhaps with Descartes and culminating with Kant. Kant’s Copernican revolution in thought, which led to what we now call critical philosophy, has provided us, in my opinion, with many tools that may improve the “primitive technique” of the pre-critical philosophies that Whitehead points to. However, as many of us know and lament, where in the Middle Ages we had vast ideas and poor technique, we now, in the postmodern period, have advanced technique but no vast ideas (hooray for a return of speculative philosophy!)
In this sense I respect a good deal of what the Integral Theorists are doing with regards to engaging in “post-metaphysical thinking” (i.e. post-Kantian philosophy) whilst still attempting a rigorous account of ontology or metaphysics. I share the desire to accomplish this task with the Integral Theorists, even as I differ with them on many important issues. Antonio, I found your comments regarding the “AQ” in “AQAL” to be almost identical to criticisms I have made in the past. I really do find the quadrants helpful, but beyond that the AQAL system feels very heavy to me- almost like an OS that takes up so much space on a computer that it can’t actually perform any of the functions it is designed to run.
If I am overly critical here, let me say this: I am on the whole sympathetic to the aim and trajectory of Integral Ecology but this chapter in particular is difficult for me as I feel mired down in the complexities of the system. In this sense I agree with Whitehead and feel that we could perhaps put more emphasis on description, rather than so much on classification. On this last point I am very favorable to Bruno Latour’s work (another Whiteheadian), and his call to “follow the actors,” which to me sounds more like Whiteheads emphasis on description over classification. At the end of the day, I really enjoy methodological pluralism and the usefulness of the quadrants, but find myself skeptical of the lines, waves, and states. As always, there is more to be said here, but that’s all for now.
Adam, you hit the nail on the head with Whitehead’s distinction between classification and measurement/description, which seems roughly parallel to the Hegelian distinction between system and method, respectively. The AQAL model seems too precise on classification (integral math is my favorite example of such excessive precision), and not precise enough on measurement (as indicated by the failure of Integral Theory to attend to the specificities of the discourses and practices of Romanticism and postmodernism).
Like you point out, the AQAL model’s overemphasis on classification and system is not necessarily bad, as it redresses a modern privileging of technique and critique over big ideas and speculative metaphysics. In this regard, Integral Post-Metaphysics (IPM) is one of the most important areas of study for the further development of Integral Theory. IPM can support the articulation of metaphysics that, following Habermas’ definition of post-metaphysical thinking, are committed to realism, pluralism, and practice/pragmatics. For me, one of the biggest problems with IPM is that it sounds too Habermasian (i.e., too neo-Kantian). Incidentally, I’m writing a chapter on IPM for an integral philosophy book. I argue that Integral philosophy needs to shift away from the Habermasian vibe and bring in more speculative realism (specifically object-oriented ontology), which echoes your call for a more Latourian approach (i.e., following actors).
Finally, I like your image of AQAL as “an OS that takes up so much space on a computer that it can’t actually perform any of the functions it is designed to run.” As you might know, Integral theorists do indeed describe their system as an Integral Operating System, which is sold as a kit that includes a booklet, DVD, CDs, and a fold-out AQAL chart. The basic outline of the system makes it look easy to operationalize, but when you get into the details of actually running it, it is full of excessive classifications (argumentum verbosium fallacy?) that slow your computer too much to perform. This stands in contrast to the streamlined OS of Latour’s actor-network theory, which runs as fast as a cheetah.
Thanks Adam for your comment and your OS metaphor. I’m still wondering if the AQ part can be separated out, and if so, are there any comparable models? Or is it strictly Wilberian? If you mash up Guattari’s three ecologies and the circuit of culture from cultural studies, I think there is some cross-over with the AQ grid. I’d like to use the AQ grid in my work, but at the same time leave out the AL. I don’t know if that is intellectually honest.
Antonio, you can definitely separate the AQ from the AL without being intellectually dishonest. Although their writing doesn’t always reflect it, Integral theorists are generally very amenable to having the AQAL framework cut up and redistributed in numerous ways. If it suits your work to use the quadrants without differentiating between levels, then go for it. I’ve also talked with people who use the levels but do so in a way that doesn’t hierarchize them vertically but places them in webs or horizontal hierarchies. In short, Integral theorists encourage a lot of flexibility in the way AQAL is used. The important thing isn’t whether you use the model exactly as it is articulated by Wilber, but whether you use the model in a way that facilitates your engagement with your objects of study. In that sense, “Integral Ecology has something in common with environmental pragmatism” (p. 554n57).
Along with the tri-ecological vision found in Guattari and of Wilber’s big three, the integral ecology model proposed by Leonardo Boff brings together the mental, social, and environmental dimensions of ecology. Boff is influenced by Guattari’s three ecologies and by the cosmogenetic principle of Thomas Berry and Brian Swimme, which is a threefold principle involving autopoiesis, communion, and differentiation (mental, social, and environmental, respectively).
I’m looking forward to hearing more critiques of the levels as we read about Integral concepts of developmental levels in the next two chapters. Interestingly, I think the AQAL model suggests that it is only at a very high level of psychological development that people can understand complex developmental systems without reducing them to hierarchies of levels.
These are really helpful comments, Sam. Perhaps some of the difficulty I have in wrapping my head around AQAL stems simply from the fact that, in the texts, one is often confronted with the whole system as a totality. It really makes much more sense to read this chapter as an overview of the different types of insight AQAL can provide, rather than as a suggestion that at all points in the research process, every element of the model must be utilized.
Thanks Sam for your helpful comments. I appreciate your stance that the model should be practical. I can certainly see the potential for that. I still feel like E-H&Z are sticklers for the totality of the model. Later in the book when they get into some case studies it seems like they run scenarios through the levels pretty exhaustively. I remember when reading the case studies that it was a bit over the top–perhaps too much for my own style. However, I also could see the benefit of looking at a scenario from so many different perspectives. We’ll get into this later, but as I stated earlier, my biggest problem with the levels is the classification system of psychological states based on spiral dynamics. I’m not convinced that the model is universal as Beck and Cowen claim. But I’m getting ahead of myself. We can talk about that later.
Thanks, Antonio. I share your concern over the universality of the spiral dynamics model. Instead of being universal, the AQAL framework is supposed to be a “broad orienting map” or a set of “orienting generalizations” (p. 116) whose enactment depends upon participation in concrete situations. This tension between universality and participatory enactment occurs throughout Integral theory writings for the last decade, due in part to criticisms of Wilber’s universalizing tendencies. A good example of such criticisms can be found in Jorge Ferrer, Revisioning Transpersonal Theory: A Participatory Vision of Human Spirituality [SUNY Press, 2002]. Yes, we’ll talk more about this later. A lot of developmental talk is coming next week.
Thanks, Sam, for your thorough summary of this fairly complex conceptual terrain. And thanks, Adam, for pinpointing a few of the weaknesses.
I agree that the oversized OS metaphor seems apt. I wonder, though, if the problem is inherent to any model that attempts to account for complexity in everything at once: social, psychological, material/ecological, etc. Latour’s ant may be a cheetah, but it skimps on psychology, politics, and other things (as its critics have pointed out over the years). Experimenting with the pieces – as in Antonio’s idea of having the AQ without the AL – can be useful, I think: for instance, the AQ can be made to work like a Guattarian machine, or a Peircian semiotic hub (Wilber’s “big three” being analogous to Peirce’s triadics). But it’s the hierarchic developmentalism that has always been Wilber’s hallmark. On the other hand, submitting those (AL) parts of Wilber’s model to empirical data might result in a loosening of some of its built-in assumptions, e.g. into a more horizontal understanding of hierarchies (a la DeLanda).
Thanks for mentioning Boff, Sam. Is there a work or two of his where he specifically integrates Guattari with Berry/Swimme? That’s very intriguing (if not surprising, given Guattari’s influence in Brazil and Boff’s theological background).
Great comments, Adrian. Regarding your Boff question: Boff mentions Guattari as well as Berry/Swimme in Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor. Throughout this and other works, he doesn’t mention Guattari as much as Berry/Swimme, and in any case, he’s not very good with citing sources. For instance, Boff refers to the star “Tiamat” without mentioning that it is a quasi-mythical figure in the Berry/Swimme Universe Story and is not the name of a particular star studied by cosmologists. So, to some extent, we have to do some extrapolating to discern Boff’s influences.
Boff’s recent book (The Tao of Liberation, with Mark Hathaway) uses a lot of Berry/Swimme and integrates Guattari (although the latter isn’t mentioned explicitly). Boff’s definition of integral ecology in that book (and on his website) brings together Guattari’s mental, social, and environmental ecologies with the autopoiesis, communion, and differentiation that make up the cosmogenetic principle of Berry/Swimme. Incidentally, those triads are analogous to Wilber’s big three. It seems like the tri-ecological vision is one of the common threads tying together the different approaches to integral ecology.
“It seems like the tri-ecological vision is one of the common threads tying together the different approaches to integral ecology.”
The tri-ecological vision (taken directly from Guattari, but thrashed through a Whiteheadian-Peircian workout) is central to my own work, as Ecologies of the Moving Image will show (which is getting close to being sent off to the publisher). So I guess that makes me an integral ecologist… Not sure what I think of the label, but what the hell…
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Can you point me to some specific works that criticize the ANT approach, Adrian? I am specifically interested in the role of psychology, personhood, or, in this context, interiority, as they relate to Latour’s philosophy and anthropology. Any suggestions are welcome.
Adam – Off the top of my head (I don’t have my ANT library with me), the piece by Laurier & Philo and those listed in note #6 in this article provide some useful criticism of ANT:
Toward a Multicultural Ecology – available in PDF form here: http://www.uvm.edu/%7Eaivakhiv/Toward.pdf
Since that piece was written, Noel Castree, Joel Wainwright, Alan Rudy, and several others have written perceptive critiques. (I’m mentioning mostly geographers because those are the ones I’m most familiar with. They tend to focus more on politics than psychology, but I’ve seen critiques in the critical psychology literature as well.)
Latour and others have responded to some degree. My favorite post-ANT writer is probably John Law, who I discuss in this piece:
http://www.uvm.edu/%7Eaivakhiv/Social_nature.pdf
Hope that’s helpful,
Adrian
All that said, I think ANT’s intervention was a very important one, and I find the general approach very useful (as you can see from the “Toward” piece). The work Harman has done with it has given it more life in some important respects.
Someone should eventually write a biography of ANT and its relations to the French philosophical (Serres, Deleuze, Stengers, et al) and Anglophone science-studies and organizational theory scenes – and now OOO/speculative realism – as has been done with poststructuralism(s).
I know this is off topic but I’d like to read Sam’s article “Cosmological Postmodernism in Whitehead, Deleuze, and Derrida.” Is it available online somewhere? Thanks in advance.
I don’t think my cosmo-pomo essay is online. If you can buy the issue of Process Studies, I recommend it, especially for the section of essays on Isabelle Stengers’ book on Whitehead (including a response essay from Stengers). In any case, you can email me for a pdf at srmickey@usfca.edu
Thanks!
Serge Durand a dit… Bonjour, cela fait maintenant quleuqes temps que j’ai pris ou que les circonstances m’ont fait prendre des distances avec le mouvement d’Andrew Cohen. A un moment donne9 j’e9tais preat e0 dire qu’il e9tait mon maeetre. Mais mon rapport e0 la spiritualite9 inte9grale est toujours passe9 par mon rapport e0 la de9marche de Sri Aurobindo, Me8re et Satprem. Pendant un temps j’avais l’impression que l’enseignement d’Andrew Cohen convergeait avec cette approche d’une e9volution consciente de la conscience. Sur la question de l’e2me, il y avait eu ainsi une e9volution notable. Mais peu e0 peu j’ai ressenti que l’engagement au service d’une conscience collective avait plus de poids que l’e9mergence de l’e2me. Or j’ai compris que l’e9volution consciente de la conscience exige une individualisation sans pre9ce9dent pour vraiment ge9ne9rer une conscience collective authentique. Ce que Andrew appelle le narcissisme postmoderne n’est pas un exce8s d’individualisation, c’est au contraire une soumission e0 des canons et des normes esthe9tiques, culturels, sexuels, etc. Il y a plus de mime9tisme que de puissance cre9atrice dans l’individualisme postmoderne. Andrew de9gage bien la possibilite9 d’un champ de conscience collectif que j’ai e9prouve9 dans la communication e9veille9e. Mais cela permet-il de s’individualiser profonde9ment ? Cela permet-il de se soumettre au principe e9volutif d’Un-dividualisation au coeur duquel l’Un source e0 l’e9vidence se de9multiplie ? LA RIGUEUR de Sri Aurobindo me paraeet e0 ce sujet bien plus vaste que celle d’Andrew Cohen ou que celle de Ken Wilber qui intellectuellement l’inspire. L’approche de Ken Wilber ne lui permet pas de soupe7onner qu’il n’a ni le monopole de l’Un ni le sens profond de la diversite9. J’ai commence9 e0 re9aliser cela quand j’ai fait lire Une bre8ve histoire de tout de Ken Wilber e0 une de mes connaissances plus habitue9e e0 Hans Jonas, Teilhard et Bergson. Elle m’a dit qu’une telle approche minimisait la personne. Moi je ne voyais pas bien en quoi. C’est le retour e0 Sri Aurobindo qui m’a e9claire9 sur ce point : il y avait un pf4le individuel et personnel absolu autant qu’un pf4le universel ou qu’un pf4le de transcendance. Les derniers ouvrages de Ken Wilber introduisent un Tu mais je crois que c’est insuffisant : un pf4le d’individualisation fait encore de9faut dans sa conception de l’absolu lui-meame, sa compre9hension de l’individualisation reste trop relative. Je me suis apere7u que ce pf4le e9tait bien plus central dans la conception e9ducative et de la relation spirituelle maeetre disciple chez Sri Aurobindo, Me8re et Satprem. Chez Ken Wilber il y a de l’oeucume9nisme spirituel et c’est pourquoi Andrew a sa place dans son mouvement mais l’individualisation de l’e9volution spirituelle n’a pas encore sa place pratique et the9orique Je ne vois gue8re un sens de l’individualisation au niveau de la pratique des techniques spirituelles chez Enlightenext, le mouvemement d’Andrew. Quand je regarde les de9e7us et les amers d’Andrew, il manque souvent une perspective spirituelle d’analyse car comme le remarque avec justesse Sri Aurobindo un bon disciple peut tirer le meilleur du maeetre le plus ambigu et c’est de ce meilleur qu’on peut alors comprendre vraiment les limites de son ex-maeetre. Donc je dis aussi e0 ma fae7on Andrew Cohen e0 50%. Cordialement, Serge.
I respond a little here. Great post.